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1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, a series of papers by various distinguished math-
ematical physicists stressed the importance of the concept of typicality as a
basis for probabilistic reasoning in physics, in particular as a basis for the
explanation of the second law of thermodynamics in statistical mechanics
(Lebowitz, 1993; Bricmont, 1995; Penrose, 1999; Goldstein, 2001). None of
the authors took much credit for the ideas he presented, each of them rather
stressed that he was recapturing or reformulating the groundbreaking in-
sights of Ludwig Boltzmann who, more than one century ago, had shown how
to explain and derive macroscopic regularities from the underlying laws gov-
erning the motion of the microscopic constituents of matter. However, rein-
troducing these ideas to physicists, mathematicians and philosophers proved
to be highly necessary as their relevance is rarely appreciated today and the
response to the papers of Lebowitz, Goldstein and others shows that they
are still subject to widespread misconceptions and misunderstandings.
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive summary of the typicality
account, spelling out some of the details and subtleties that have remained
unspoken in the before-mentioned presentations, thus having left room for
objections and misunderstandings that we hope to eliminate (Section 2). We
also demonstrate the conceptual continuity between the H-theorem and the
general typicality account, showing that it is false that they are often viewed
as alternatives (Section 3). Putting things in wider perspective, we discuss
the relevance of typicality for scientific reasoning in general, in particular for
understanding the reduction of macroscopic laws to microscopic laws (Section
4). Finally, we address the most common objections against the typicality
account that have been raised in the contemporary literature (Section5).
2 Boltzmann’s statistical mechanics
2.1 The typicality account
Our discussion is concerned with the explanation of the irreversible thermo-
dynamic behavior of macroscopic systems. The term “thermodynamic be-
havior” thereby refers to the ubiquitous phenomenon that physical systems,
prepared or created in a non-equilibrium state and then suitably isolated
from the environment, tend to evolve to and then stay in a distinguished
macroscopic configuration called the equilibrium state. Familiar examples
are the spreading of a gas, the mixing of milk and coffee, the disappearance
2
of temperature gradients, and so on.
Historically, this empirical regularity was captured by the second law of
thermodynamics, positing the monotonous increase of a macroscopic variable
of state called entropy, which attains its maximum value in equilibrium. The
main task of statistical mechanics is to explain this macroscopic regularity
on the basis of the underlying laws guiding the behavior of the system’s
micro-constituents.
A crucial ingredient to the understanding of this issue is the distinction
between macro- and microstate of a system. Whereas the microstate X(t) of
a system is given by the complete specification of all its microscopic degrees of
freedom, its macrostate M(t) is specified in terms of physical variables that
characterize the system on macroscopic scales (like it’s volume, pressure,
temperature, and so on). The macroscopic state of a system is completely
determined by its microscopic configuration, that is M(t) = M(X(t)), but
one and the same macrostate can be realized by a large number of different
microstates all of which “look macroscopically the same”. The partitioning
of the set of microstates into sets corresponding to macroscopically distinct
states is therefore called a “coarse-graining”. Turning to the phase-space
picture of Hamiltonian mechanics for an N -particle system, a microstate
corresponds to one point X = (q, p) in phase-space Ω ∼= R3N × R3N , q =
(q1, q2, ..., qN ) being the position- and p = (p1, p2, ..., pN ) the momentum-
coordinates of the N particles, whereas a macrostate M corresponds to an
entire region ΓM ⊆ Ω of phase-space, namely the set of all microstates
that realize M . The microscopic laws of motion are such that any initial
microstate X0 determines the complete microevolution X(t) = φt(X0) of
the system, represented by a unique trajectory in phase-space going through
X0, thereby also determining its complete macro-evolution M(X(t)) as the
microstate passes through different macro-regions.
These concepts are pretty much forced on us if we accept the superve-
nience of macroscopic facts on microscopic facts and they are essential to
understanding the nature of the problem. The second law of thermodynam-
ics describes an empirical regularity about the macro-evolution M(t) of a
physical system. This macro-evolution, however, supervenes on the evolu-
tion of the system’s microscopic configuration which is determined by precise
and unambiguous laws of motion. The aspiration of statistical mechanics is
thus to explain or justify the empirical regularity expressed in the macro-
scopic law on the basis of the underlying microscopic theory. This seems
like a quite formidable task, though, as it requires us to reconcile the irre-
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versibility of thermodynamic behavior with the time-reversal symmetry of
the microscopic laws of motion. The task was nevertheless accomplished by
Ludwig Boltzmann at the end of the 19th century and we recall that his
account was crucially based on two profound insights:
1. The identification of the (Clausius) entropy with the (logarithm of) the
phase-space volume corresponding to its current macrostate. Formally:
S = kB ln |ΓM(X)|, (1)
where kB is the Boltzmann constant and |ΓM | denotes the volume
(the Lebesgue or Liouville measure) of the phase-space region ΓM .
The Boltzmann entropy is thus de facto a logarithmic measure of the
phase-space volume corresponding to the system’s macrostate.
2. The understanding that the equilibrium macro-region occupies almost
the entire phase-space volume, i.e., that almost every microstate is
an equilibrium state. Note that the logarithm in the definition of the
Boltzmann entropy has the effect that significant differences in entropy
correspond to huge differences in the phase-space volume corresponding
to the respective macrostates. And indeed, we will generally find that
for macroscopic systems, i.e. for systems with a very large number
of microscopic degrees of freedom, the partitioning of microstates into
macrostates does not correspond to a partitioning of phase-space into
regions of roughly the same size, but into regions whose sizes vary by a
great many orders of magnitude, with the region of maximum entropy
– by definition the equilibrium region – being by far the largest.
These two insights are the key ingredients in Boltzmann’s account of the
second law of thermodynamics. What we learn from them is, first and fore-
most, that the thermodynamic behavior that we want to explain is not a
feature of certain particular micro-evolutions, but rather the kind of macro-
behavior that would correspond to almost any generic trajectory that the
configuration of a macroscopic system, starting in a non-equilibrium region,
could follow through phase-space. Indeed, the dynamics of a system whose
microscopic configuration starts out in a tiny non-equilibrium macro-region
would have to be extremely peculiar to avoid carrying the micro-state into
larger and larger phase-space volumes, corresponding to gradually increas-
ing entropy, and finally into the equilibrium region where it will spend by
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far most of the time (except for small fluctuations of the entropy about its
maximum value). This is why accounts of the second law insisting that the
explanation of thermodynamic behavior must be grounded in some special
property pertaining to solutions of the microscopic equations of motion, e.g.,
they being ergodic (Frigg and Werndl, 2011, 2012), are on the wrong track,
disregarding the extraordinary robustness of Boltzmann’s arguments against
the details of the microscopic theory.
Nevertheless, critics have devoted multiple publications and many pages
to pointing out that, if we consider a system in a initial non-equilibrium mi-
crostate, we cannot conclude that it must evolve into equilibrium solely on
the basis that the equilibrium-region is vastly larger than the non-equilibrium
region, covering almost the entire phase-space (Frigg, 2009, 2011, see also
the discussion in Section 5). And while this is, as such, a correct observation,
it is crucial to understand that this is not what the typicality account, in the
end, claims (and it is not what Boltzmann had claimed, at least since 1876).
Indeed, we know for a fact that, given a low-entropy macro-state M2, there
exist initial conditions in the corresponding macro-region ΓM2 that will not
evolve to equilibrium but follow a trajectory of decreasing entropy instead.
And this is not, in the first place, due to any involved mathematical or philo-
sophical argument, but a straightforward consequence of the reversibility of
the microscopic laws as was famously pointed out by Johann Loschmidt in
1876. So Lebowitz rightly warned us, quoting Ruelle, that the ideas of Boltz-
mann are “at the same time simple and rather subtle” (Lebowitz, 1993, p.
7).
To discuss these subtleties and make the typicality reasoning more pre-
cise, we turn to the paradigmatic example of a gas in a box. We thus consider
a system of about N = 1023 particles, interacting by a repelling short-range
potential, which are confined to a finite volume within a box with reflecting
walls. Now assume that we find or prepare the system in the macrostate M2
sketched below (Fig. 1), that is, we consider a particle configuration that
looks, macroscopically, like a gas filling out half the volume. What kind of
evolution, on the macroscopic scale, should we expect for the gas?
Well, a simple combinatorial argument, given by Boltzmann, shows that
the overwhelming majority of microstates that the system could possibly
evolve in will look, macroscopically, like Meq, i.e. like a gas that is homoge-
neously distributed over the entire volume of the box. In fact, one can read-
ily conclude that the phase-space volume corresponding to this equilibrium
marostate Meq is about 2N ≈ 101023 times (!) larger than the phase-space
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Figure 1: Thermodynamic evolution of a gas
volume occupied by configurations with substantially lower entropy. Hence,
as the particles move with different speeds in different directions, scattering
from each other and occasionally from the walls, the system’s microstate
wanders around on an erratic path in the high-dimensional phase-space and
we should expect, by all reasonable means, that this path will soon end up
in the equilibrium region ΓMeq (and then leave ΓMeq only very rarely, cor-
responding to small fluctuations of the entropy about its maximal value).1
However, it is clear (and it was clear to Boltzmann) that there are initial
conditions in ΓM2 for which the system will not exhibit this “expected” (we
will later say typical) macro-behavior, but follow an anti-thermodynamic
trajectory. For if we consider a macrostate of even lower entropy, M1, the
time-reversal symmetry of the equations of motions implies that for every
solution corresponding to a macro-evolution from M1 to M2, there exists
another solution carrying an initial microstate in ΓM2 into the lower-entropy
macro-region ΓM1 . And yet, as Boltzmann understood, the microstates (the
initial conditions in ΓM2) that lead to such an anti-thermodynamic evolution
are extremely special ones relative to all possible microstates realizing M2.
The correct statement is thus that almost all initial microstates in ΓM2 will
evolve into the equilibrium-region Γeq, while only a very small set of “bad”
initial conditions will show the anti-thermodynamic evolution from ΓM2 into
ΓM1 . We will make these arguments more precise in a minute.
For now, let us emphasize that it’s more appropriate not to consider any
1Larger fluctuations, i.e. from Meq back into M2, are possible as well. However, as
(Boltzmann, 1896b) already noted, the time-scales on which that substantial fluctuations
are to be expected are so astronomical – about 1010
20
years for the gas model – that they
have absolutely no empirical relevance.
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individual trajectory, but the set of all solutions with initial condition in ΓM2 .
The dynamics of a system of about N ∼ 1023 particles are highly chaotic, in
the sense that even the slightest variation in the initial configuration can lead
to considerable differences in the time-evolution. Under the Hamiltonian
dynamics, the set of microstates realizing M2 at the initial time will thus
quickly spread all over phase-space (respectively a hypersurface compatible
with its constants of motion) with the overwhelming majority of microstates
ending up in the equilibrium-region and only a small fraction of special initial
configurations evolving into the comparably tiny macro-regions of equal or
lower entropy.
All in all, Boltzmann’s analysis tells us that it cannot be true that every
non-equilibrium configuration will follow the second law of thermodynamics
and undergo an evolution of increasing entropy. We can, however, assert that
typical microscopic configurations, realizing a low-entropy initial macrostate,
will evolve into equilibrium and stay in equilibrium for most of the time.
2.2 The measure of typicality
Throughout this argument, the intuitive notions of almost all and extremely
special, that we used synonymously to typical/atypical, were understood in
terms of the stationary Liouville measure, i.e. in terms of the phase-space
volume of the set of microstates with the relevant property. More precisely,
for a perfectly isolated system with total energy E, we would have to consider
not the Liouville measure but the induced microcanonical measure µE on the
hypersurface ΓE ⊂ Ω, to which the motion of the system is confined in virtue
of the energy conservation. For simplicity, we will omit this distinction and
merely refer to “phase-space” and the “measure” or “size” of macro-regions.
In any case, a crucial property of the Liouville measure as well as the
microcanonical measure is their stationarity under the microscopic time-
evolution. Intuitively, this means that the Hamiltonian flow φt behaves like
an incompressible fluid on phase-space. Formally, it means that for all mea-
surable sets A ⊆ Ω and all times t ∈ R, we have |φt(A)| = |A|. This is such
an essential feature because it means that
a) the notion of typicality is timeless, i.e. a typicality statement does not
depend on a reference to any external time-parameter.
b) the Hamiltonian dynamics “care about” the measure of the macro-regions
that play such a central role in the argument in the sense that the sta-
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tionary measure as a measure on initial conditions carries over to a well-
defined measure on solution trajectories, which is such that the number
of trajectories passing through a phase-space region at any given time is
proportional to the size of that region.
Turning back to Boltzmann’s explanation of the second law, we note that the
Liouville measure (respectively the microcanonical measure) as a typicality
measure serves two purposes in the argument:
1. To establish that the region of phase-space corresponding to the macrostate
M2 is very much larger than the region of phase-space corresponding to
the macrostate M1, and that the region of phase-space corresponding
to the equilibrium macrostate Meq is very much larger than the region
of phase-space corresponding to the macrostate M2, so large, in fact,
that it occupies almost the entire phase-space volume.
It is easy to learn about this “dominance of the equilibrium state”
(Frigg, 2009) and yet hard to appreciate what it is really saying, since
the scale of the proportions expressed by the innocuous term “almost
entirely” are beyond anything that we could intuitively grasp (just
think of the ratio 101023 : 1 for the gas-model).
2. To define a notion of typicality relative to the current macrostate of the
system, allowing us to assert, for instance, that almost all microstates
in the non-equilibrium region ΓM2 will evolve into equilibrium.
Regarding the meaning of “almost all”, one should note that it’s only in
the idealized situation of a thermodynamic limit (where the number of
microscopic degrees of freedom goes to infinity) that one can expect the
exception set of “bad” configurations to be of measure zero, while if we
argue about a realistic system, the atypicality of such configurations
is substantiated by the fact that they have very very small (though
positive) measure compared to that of all microstates realizing M2.
In fact, stationarity of the Liouville measure allows us to estimate the
measure of the good microstates relative to the bad microstates in ΓM2
by the ratio of phase-space volume occupied by M2 to the phase-space
volume corresponding to states of lower entropy. For let B ⊂ ΓM2 be
the set of initial conditions that will have evolved into a lower-entropy
region ΓM1 after a time ∆t, then Φ∆t(B) ⊆ ΓM1 and thus |B| =
|Φ∆t(B)| ≤ |ΓM1 |, so that |B| : |ΓM2 | ≈ |ΓM1 | : |ΓM2 | ≈ 1 : 1010
23 .
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2.3 Irreversibility
By incorporating into our analysis what is essentially Boltzmann’s answer
to Loschmidt’s reversibility objection, we have already seen the solution to
the problem that seemed like the greatest challenge to our reductionist en-
terprise: the prima facie contradiction between the irreversibility of thermo-
dynamic processes and the reversibility of the underlying mechanical laws.
To emphasize how this apparent contradiction is resolved, we recall that it
was essential to our argument that it always referred to (typical or atypical)
initial conditions relative to the initial macrostate. Of course, in terms of
overall phase-space volume, a non-equilibrium macrostate occupies a vanish-
ingly small fraction of phase-space to begin with, corresponding (if you will)
to a very low a priori probability. The relevant notion of typicality when dis-
cussing convergence to equilibrium from a non-equilibrium macrostateM2 is
thus defined by the Liouville measure conditioned on the fact that the initial
microstate is in the respective phase-space region ΓM2 .
Now, as we already observed, the time-symmetry of the microscopic laws
manifests itself in the fact that the phase-space volume occupied by the bad
initial conditions in Γeq, for which the system will fluctuate out of equilibrium
into the macrostateM2 (let’s say), is just as large as the phase-space volume
occupied by the good initial conditions in ΓM2 for which the system will relax
into equilibrium. In other words, over any given period of time, there are
just as many solutions that evolve into equilibrium, as there are solutions
evolving out of equilibrium into a lower entropy state, but the first case
is nevertheless typical for systems in non-equilibrium, whereas the second
case is atypical with respect to all possible equilibrium configurations in
Γeq. It is this fact and this fact alone that establishes the irreversibility of
thermodynamic behavior.
2.4 The Past Hypothesis and the thermodynamic arrow
By telling us that the origin of the thermodynamic asymmetry that is ex-
pressed in the ‘second law’ lies only in the specialness of the initial low-
entropy macrostates, the typicality account is shifting the explanatory bur-
den from why it is that a system in non-equilibrium typically relaxes to
equilibrium (once macroscopic constraints are removed), to why it is that
we find systems in such special states in the first place. Note that a typical
configuration simpliciter, i.e. a typical configuration with respect to all pos-
sible microstates, is a state for which the system is in equilibrium, will be in
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equilibrium for most of its future and has been in equilibrium for most of its
past – which thus describes a time-symmetric situation.
Of course, as long as we are preoccupied with boxes of gas, or melting
ice-cubes, or other confined systems, their low-entropy states will always be
attributable to influences from outside, i.e. to the fact that these systems
are actually part of some larger system (usually containing a physicist, or
a freezer, or the like) before “branching off” to undergo a more or less au-
tonomous evolution as more or less isolated subsystems. This presupposes,
however, that those larger systems have been out of equilibrium themselves,
otherwise they could not have given rise to subsystems with less then maxi-
mal entropy without violating the second law. And if we think this through
to the end, we finally arrive at the question why it is that we find our uni-
verse in such a special state, far away from equilibrium (and how we justify
our believe that it was even further away from equilibrium the farther we
go back in the past). This is what Goldstein calls the “hard part of the
problem [of irreversibility]” (Goldstein, 2001, p. 49) and it concerns, broadly
speaking, the origin of irreversibility and the thermodynamic arrow of time
in our universe. Dealing with the “hard part” would require us to discuss
the meaning and the status of the Past Hypothesis2 stipulating a very-low-
entropy initial state of our universe. However, this issue is beyond the scope
of the present paper and we shall return to it only briefly in the course of
our discussion.
3 Typicality and the H-theorem
Although the formula engraved on Boltzmann’s tombstone is equation (1),
connecting the entropy of a microstate with the “probability” of the corre-
sponding macrostate, his name is at least as intimately associated with the
Boltzmann equation and the H-theorem, describing, in a more quantitative
manner, convergence to equilibrium for a low-density gas. This H-theorem
is of great interest in the light of our previous discussion, first, because it il-
lustrates very clearly the need for a typicality argument and second, because
it can be viewed as a concrete implementation of the general scheme that
we’ve just presented. In this context, we want to counter a common miscon-
ception that has most likely arisen from Boltzmann’s first presentation of
2The term “Past Hypothesis” is due to (Albert, 2000), though the necessity of such an
assumption was already noted by Boltzmann (1896a, pp. 252-253). See also (Feynman,
1967) and (Carroll, 2010) for a very nice discussion.
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the H-theorem and persisted despite his more refined argumentation in later
writings, namely that the H-theorem and the typicality account are some-
how competing accounts of macroscopic irreversibility and the convergence
to equilibrium. Huw Price, for instance, writes with respect to the latter:
In essence, I think – although he himself does not present it in
these terms – what Boltzmann offers is an alternative to his own
famous H-Theorem. The H-theorem offers a dynamical argument
that the entropy of a non-equilibrium system must increase over
time, as a result of collisions between its constituent particles.
[...] The statistical approach does away with this dynamical ar-
gument altogether. (Price, 2002, p. 27)
The pertinent entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Uffink,
2008), too presents Boltzmann’s work as a series of rather incoherent (and
ultimately wanting) attempts to explain the second law.
We are convinced that the reason why Boltzmann did not present the
“statistical approach” as an alternative to the H-theorem is that, in fact, it
isn’t. Understood correctly, there is a clear conceptual continuity between
the H-theorem and the typicality account so that the latter does not ap-
pear as a break with Boltzmann’s earlier work, but as a distillation of its
essence (cf. Goldstein, 2012; Goldstein and Lebowitz, 2004). Understanding
this connection, we will also see that the main objection raised against the
conclusiveness of the H-theorem, concerning its account of thermodynamic
irreversibility, is unfounded. To make this case, we shall first review what
the H-theorem is about and how it’s grounded in the microscopic theory.3
3.1 The H-theorem
Recall that the microstate of an N -particle system is represented by a point
X = (q1, ..., qN ; p1, ..., pN ) ∈ Ω in 6N -dimensional phase-space, compris-
ing the position and momenta of all particles. The same state (modulo
permutations of the particles) can also be represented as N points in the
6-dimensional µ-space, whose coordinates correspond to position and veloc-
ity of a single particle, i.e. X → {(q1, v1), ..., (qN , vN )}, with vi := pi/m.
The H-theorem is concerned with the evolution of a function fX(q, v) on
µ-space, that is supposed to provide an efficient description of the most im-
portant (macroscopic) characteristics of the gas in the microstate X. This
3For a good introduction, see, for instance, (Davies, 1977). For a detailed mathematical
treatment, see (Spohn, 1991), (Villani, 2002), and (Lebowitz, 1981).
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function is defined as the empirical distribution or coarse-grained density of
points in µ-space. In principle, one can think of dividing µ-space into little
cells whose dimension is large enough to contain a great number of particles,
yet very small compared to the resolution of macroscopic observations, and
counting the number of particles in each cell. For fixed q and v, fX(q, v)
thus corresponds to the proportion of particles located near q with velocity
approximately v. In the limit where the size of the cells goes to zero, the
empirical distribution becomes the actual distribution
fX(t)(q, v) :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
δ(q − qi(t)) δ(v − 1
m
pi(t)).
We give this formula to emphasize that, although fX(q, v) is technically a
probability measure, there’s is nothing random about it. In fact, it’s more
adequate to think of it as a macroscopic variable, determined, as it always is,
by the microscopic configuration of the system. In particular, the distribu-
tion function does not describe a random system or an ensemble of systems,
but pertains to a coarse-grained description of an individual system, so that
every microstate X determines a unique fX(q, v), while many different mi-
croscopic configurations will coarse-grain to the same µ-space density.
Now the first crucial result is that although the empirical distribution
can be different for different microscopic configurations X, it is in fact (more
or less) the same for an overwhelming majority of possible X. That is, one
can show that for typical X ∈ Γ, the distribution function is of the form
fX(q, v) ∝ e− 12mβv2 ,
for some constant β that is later identified with the inverse temperature of
the system. This is the famous Maxwell or Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution,
which is hence the equilibrium distribution of the gas. The distribution
having no q-dependence means that the gas is homogeneously distributed
over the entire volume with no correlations between position and velocities,
i.e. with uniform temperature.
The goal of Boltzmann’s famous H-theorem is thus to show the con-
vergence of an initial non-equilibrium distribution f0(q, v) to the Maxwell-
distribution feq(q, v). The result is thereby based on three claims:
1) For a low-density gas, the time-evolution of fX(t)(q, v) is well described
by an effective equation now known as the Boltzmann equation.
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Starting with an initial distribution f0(q, v) = fX0(q, v), it’s important
to distinguish the function fX(t)(q, v) – whose time-evolution is always
determined by that of the microstate X(t) – from the solution f(t, q, v)
of the Boltzmann equation with initial condition f(0, q, v) = f0(q, v) (re-
spectively a smooth approximation thereof). The relevant claim is then
that for typical initial conditions, fX(t)(q, v) will be (in a precisely spec-
ified way) close to f(t, q, v) for a sufficiently long period of time, thus
providing an effective description of the system’s time-evolution.
2) For a solution f(t, q, v) of the Boltzmann-equation, the H-function
H(f(t, q, v)) :=
∫
f(t, q, v) log f(t, q, v)dqdv
is monotonously decreasing in t.4
3) The H-functional reaches itsminimum for the Maxwell-distribution feq(q, v).
Together with 2) this implies, in particular, that the Maxwell-distribution
is a stationary solution of the Boltzmann-equation.
Statements 2) and 3) are fairly standard mathematical results. The crux
of the matter lies in statement 1). When Boltzmann first presented the H-
theorem in 1872, he argued that a diluted gas must evolve in accord with
his equation; he later had to mitigate this statement claiming, in effect, only
that it would typically do so. Indeed, we will see that 1), and therefore the
H-theorem, are genuinely typicality statements.
3.2 The Stoßzahlansatz
Boltzmann’s derivation of what is now known as the Boltzmann equation is
famously based on the Stoßzahlansatz or the assumption of molecular chaos.5
This is an assumption about the relative frequencies of collisions between
the particles in the gas. Denoting by N (t, q; v1, v2) the number of collisions
happening near q in a small time-interval around t between particles with
velocity (approximately) v1 and v2, the Stoßzahlansatz is:
N (t, q ; v1, v2) ∝ N2 f(t, q, v1)f(t, q, v2) |v1 − v2| dt dq dv1dv2, (2)
4While the “true” microscopic H(fX(t)(q, v)) fluctuates and only decreases “on average”.
5Assumption, unfortunately, is not a perfectly accurate translation of the German
word Ansatz. Whereas the first is sometimes used synonymously with a logical premise,
the later has a distinctly pragmatic element and can refer to something more akin to an
“approximation” or a “working hypothesis”.
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i.e. the relative frequency of scattering events between particles of different
velocities happening in the cell around q is assumed to be proportional to the
density of particles with the respective velocities near the respective position.
The scattering probability being proportional to the product of f(t, q, v1)
and f(t, q, v2) means that particles of different velocities are assumed to
be statistically independent as they contribute to collisions. This is, more
specifically, the meaning of molecular chaos.
Boltzmann’s derivation, although a brilliant physical argument, was far
from a rigorous proof. There are many mathematical subtleties involved
in statement 1), concerning, for instance, the existence and uniqueness of
solutions to the Boltzmann equation. However, if we can generously overlook
these technical points, it is true that if and as long as the assumption of
molecular chaos and equation (2) are valid, statement 1) is correct. Hence,
we have to ask: What is the status of molecular chaos and how is it justified?
First and foremost, we have to keep in mind that there is nothing ran-
dom about the interactions in a gas. Which particles are going to collide
and how they are going to collide is completely determined by the initial
conditions and the microscopic laws of motion. For the purpose of illus-
tration, let’s imagine that we could freeze the system at time t = 0 and
arrange the position and momentum of every single particle before letting
the clock run and the system evolve according to the deterministic laws of
Newtonian mechanics.6 We could then, for instance, arrange the initial state
in such a way that “slow” particles will almost exclusively scatter with other
“slow” particles and “fast” particles with other “fast” particles. But such
initial configurations are, obviously, very special ones. For typical micro-
scopic configurations, coarse-graining to the initial distribution f0(q, v), we
will however find that the relative frequency with which particles of different
velocities meet for the first collision is roughly proportional to the density
of particles with the respective velocities near the respective position, i.e.
given by eq. (2). This is nothing more and nothing less than the law of
large numbers, based, in effect, on simple combinatorics. The validity of (2)
at the initial time is thus, as all law-of-large-number statements, a typicality
statement and as such another mathematical fact.
We observe here the fundamental difference between the probability den-
sity f(t, q, v) and the typicality measure. The “scattering probability” at
time t is defined in terms of f(t, q, v), though it’s only for typical ini-
6Note that there is no issue here as to whether we let the clock run “forwards” or “back-
wards”, the problem is symmetric with respect to the time-evolution in both directions.
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tial conditions that the relative frequency of scatterings is actually close
to the expectation value. And typical initial conditions are defined, as
usual, by the microcanonical measure restricted to the initial macro-region
Γ0 := {X ∈ ΓE | fX(q, v) = f0(q, v)}.
This brings us, finally, to the critical part of the H-theorem. For as-
sume that after an (infinitesimal) time-interval ∆t for which the validity of
the Boltzmann-equation is established, the distribution function has evolved
into f(∆t, q, v). How do we know that (2) is still a good approximation for
all but a small set of initial conditions? It is still true that eq. (2) is satisfied
for typical microscopic configurations realizing the current distribution, i.e.
counting all possible configurations that coarse-grain to f(∆t, q, v). But we
cannot count all these configurations, since the microstates relevant to our
considerations are constraint by the condition that they have evolved from
the macro-region corresponding to the initial distribution f0(q, v). Mathe-
matically, these dynamical constraints on the “combinatorics” translate into
the statement that the µ-space coordinates of the particles at time t > 0
are no longer statistically independent, making it prima facie questionable
whether a law-or-large-number statement for the relative frequencies of par-
ticle collisions, i.e. molecular chaos, still holds. This is, notably, the only
meaningful way in which interactions build up correlations and we note, in
particular, that the situation is still identical with respect to the time evo-
lution towards the future as well as towards the past of the distinguished
initial state.
Now Boltzmann’s Stoßzahlansatz can be understood as the assumption
that statistical independence is preserved by the microscopic time-evolution,
or, in other words, that the relative frequency of collisions is always the
typical one with respect to the current empirical distribution (≈ the current
macrostate). The mathematician refers to such a proposition as propagation
of molecular chaos. Deriving the Boltzmann equation from a microscopic
model, in a rigorous mathematical sense, is thus to validate this ansatz, i.e.
to show that for typical initial conditions equation (2) remains approximately
satisfied on sufficiently long time-scales. Sufficiently long, that is, to describe
the thermodynamic evolution of a gas into equilibrium.
So, does molecular chaos propagate? That is, do the dynamics of a gas
preserve statistical independence well enough to justify the Stoßzahlansatz?
Based on physical intuition and various encouraging results, there is no rea-
sonable doubt that the answer is affirmative. Given the fact that the micro-
scopic dynamics are highly chaotic, that the number of particles in a gas is
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huge and that the gas, by assumption, very diluted so that re-collisions (col-
lisions between particles that have already collided in the past) are very rare,
it is more than plausible that the relative frequency of collisions shouldn’t
become too special – in the sense of deviating significantly from the expecta-
tion value (2) – unless the initial configuration itself was very special. And
yet, this is extremely difficult to prove; so difficult, in fact, that, as of to
date, the best mathematical results available are valid only for very short
times and a very restricted class of particle-interactions.7
Moreover, it is important to understand that, unless one considers the
thermodynamic limit of an infinitely large system, equation (2) will hold at
best approximately for all but a small set of “bad” initial conditions, that
this approximation will get worse with time, and that the approximation is
only good enough until it isn’t. Eventually, a typical system will exhibit
sizable fluctuations out of equilibrium at which point its evolution is no
longer adequately described by the Boltzmann equation.
3.3 The Stoßzahlansatz as a typicality statement
With all that said, we can now emphasize the fact that the Boltzmann equa-
tion and the H-theorem are not an alternative way to explain convergence to
equilibrium and the irreversibility of thermodynamic behavior, but rather a
concrete exemplification of the explanatory scheme that we have presented
before, in more general terms, as the typicality account. Although the mi-
cro/macro distinction does not appear as prominently in the formulation of
the H-theorem, an essential part of it is that the empirical distribution f(q, v)
pertains to a coarse-grained description of the system, hence distinguishing
a macro-region in phase-space consisting of all microscopic configurations
coarse-graining to the same µ-space density. Convergence to equilibrium is
then established for typical initial conditions with respect to that initial non-
equilibrium macro-region. And the equilibrium state – characterized by the
Maxwell-distribution to which non-equilibrium distributions typically con-
verge by virtue of the H-theorem – is, as always, distinguished by the fact
that it’s the one realized by an overwhelming majority of all microscopic
configurations. As Boltzmann himself beautifully explained:
The ensuing, most likely state [...] which we call that of the
Maxwellian velocity-distribution, since it was Maxwell who first
7See (Lanford, 1975) and (King, 1975) for the landmark results and (Gallagher et al.,
2012) and (Pulvirenti et al., 2013) for recent extensions to more general potentials.
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found the mathematical expression in a special case, is not an
outstanding singular state, opposite to which there are infinitely
many more non-Maxwellian velocity-distributions, but it is, to the
contrary, distinguished by the fact that by far the largest num-
ber of all possible states have the characteristic properties of the
Maxwellian distribution, and that compared to this number the
amount of possible velocity-distributions that deviate significantly
from Maxwell’s is vanishingly small. (Boltzmann, 1896a, p. 252,
translation by the authors)
Despite the common focus on the Stoßzahlansatz, there is a compelling case
to make that the tendency to equilibrium is by all means explained by the
dominance of the equilibrium state. (Although it will not appear among the
premises of the H-theorem, nor necessarily as an explicit part of the proof!)
The explanatory role of the Stoßzahlansatz is then somewhat subsidiary
to this insight, namely to express the fact that it’s thus the “most likely”
evolutions carrying a non-equilibrium distribution into equilibrium.
Finally, we understand that the irreversibility of the Boltzmann equa-
tion (as an effective description of a system’s macro-evolution) is – as it
cannot be otherwise – a consequence of the fact that non-equilibrium con-
figurations converging to equilibrium are typical with respect to the cor-
responding “macrostate”, whereas microscopic configurations leading to the
time-reversed evolution are atypical with respect to all equilibrium configu-
rations, i.e. all microstates coarse-graining to feq(q, v).
One will often encounter the claim that the irreversibility of the Boltz-
mann equation is a result of the Stoßzahlansatz being an explicitly time-
asymmetric assumption (e.g. Uffink, 2008; Price, 1996, 2002). This is not
correct. Of course, it is hard to see how a time-asymmetric assumption
about collisions described by reversible microscopic laws could be justified,
but Boltzmann’s arguments contain no such questionable ploys. The as-
sumption of molecular chaos breaks the time-symmetry only in the obvious
(and necessary) sense that it applies to the thermodynamic evolution but not
to the reversed motion; but this does not mean that any time-asymmetry is
smuggled into the derivation of the H-theorem in addition to the one intro-
duced by the assumption of a non-equilibrium initial distribution.
This misunderstanding, we believe, is mostly based on the failure to
recognize molecular chaos, respectively the Stoßzahlansatz, as a typicality
statement. For typical initial conditions, eq. (2) is equally valid for the
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time-evolution in both temporal directions. However, the microscopic con-
figurations that have evolved from a state of lower entropy are ipso facto
atypical with respect to their evolution in the reversed (past) time direction.
To put it differently, if the assumption of molecular chaos is justified in
the sense explained before, it will hold for typical initial configurations re-
alizing a non-equilibrium distribution, for which the H-theorem thus asserts
convergence of the distribution function to a Maxwellian distribution (to-
wards the future as well as towards the past) and it will also hold for typical
equilibrium configurations, for which the H-theorem thus asserts that the
equilibrium distribution is stationary. There is no reason, however, why it
must hold for those equilibrium configurations that are the time-reversal of
states that have just evolved from non-equilibrium, which are, after all, a
vanishingly small subset of the equilibrium region. And we know, of course,
that it doesn’t, that those states are precisely contained in the set of bad
configurations for which the particles are correlated in such a way as to
undergo a macro-evolution of decreasing entropy (increasing H) that can-
not be described by the Boltzmann equation. And we also know that the
atypicality of these states (with respect to their evolution in one temporal
direction) is explained by, or at least a necessary consequence of, the fact
that the system is assumed or constrained or observed to be in a special (i.e.
non-equilibrium) state at one particular moment in time.
The only deeper question that may be left is why the Boltzmann equation
is in fact relevant, i.e. why it is a good description of an actual gas in our
actual world. To understand the answer to this question is thus to appreciate
the meaning and relevance of typicality statements.
4 Typicality and the status of macroscopic laws
4.1 The ‘logic’ of typicality statements
One of the hurdles that may have stood in the way of appreciating Boltz-
mann’s contribution and the relevance of typicality is the fact that Nagelian
schemes of reduction and the related deductive-nomological models of phys-
ical explanation did not quite capture the subtleties of Boltzmann’s argu-
ments.8 According to these often criticized yet very persistent theories, a
microscopic explanation of the second law of thermodynamics – respectively
8See (Dizadji-Bahmani et al., 2010) for a recent defense of Nagelian reduction. On
typicality, see, e.g., (Maudlin, 2007; Bricmont, 1995; Dürr, 2009; Goldstein, 2012; Zanghi,
2005).
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a reduction by the microscopic theory – must be a derivation of the macro-
scopic law from the microscopic laws plus suitably specified auxiliary as-
sumptions or “circumstances” in which the macroscopic law is supposed to
hold. There is a certain sense in which, in the end, we will concur with this
characterization. But first, we want to emphasize one of the more problem-
atic aspects of this view, which is that an understanding of the relationship
between the macroscopic regularity and the underlying microscopic laws in
purely logical terms misses the crucial role that initial conditions play in the
explanation of a macroscopic phenomenon.
For what is it to derive the thermodynamic behavior of, let’s say, a gas
from the microscopic laws of motion? Is it to show that there exists at least
one microscopic configuration for which the gas will relax to equilibrium?
Is it to show that it will happen for all possible (non-equilibrium) config-
urations? The insufficiency of the first statement and the falsehood of the
second must severely question the adequacy of purely deductive schemes of
explanation. For suppose we wanted to account for the thermodynamic
behavior of a certain type of physical system by a scheme of the form
∀x(F (x) ⇒ G(x)), where x ranges of all possible realizations of the cor-
responding microscopic model and the predicate G is a suitable formulation
of “showing effectively/approximately thermodynamic behavior”. Then the
antecedent F (x) would have to contain a clause more or less equivalent to
the statement “The initial conditions of the system x are such that G(x)”.
But then the deduction becomes too trivial to be relevant. Of course there
exist initial conditions for which the gas will expand. There are also initial
conditions for which the gas will contract. And initial conditions for which
the gas will transform into a banana. In other words, for a system x with
sufficiently many degrees of freedom and sufficiently non-trivial dynamics
it is practically always possible to maintain that it has the (macroscopic)
property G because the initial conditions were such that G(x). The only
thing that can provide explanatory value in this context is the assertion of
typicality, i.e. the assertion that G is not a feature of certain special initial
conditions, but a physical fact that would arise from almost any initial con-
dition. This is also to assure that the explanatory work is done, as much as
possible, by the fundamental laws, rather than by some fine-tuned arrange-
ment of microscopic degrees of freedom.9
Note however that the relevant statement is now, logically and syntacti-
cally, a proposition about G rather than a proposition about any particular
9Thanks to Jenann Ismael for this insight.
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x. The “logic” of the statistical explanation of the second law is thus not
to state a set of (statistical) assumptions about an individual system from
which to infer its thermodynamic behavior, but to spell out a physical ac-
count that grounds the explanation of thermodynamic behavior in the notion
of typicality.
4.2 Typicality vs. probability
Indisputably, the common way of speaking is not to assert that a macro-
scopic feature G is typical, but to say G(x) is very likely or that we infer
G(x) with high probability. Such a probabilistic statement must, however,
raise two additional questions: a) what is it supposed to mean? and b) how
did we accomplish the feat to derive a probabilistic result from deterministic
microscopic laws? We cannot discuss here in detail how the different “inter-
pretations” of the concept of probability (subjectivist, frequentist, etc.) fare
in the context of our discussion, but we want to shed light on a few general
points to capture the intricacy of the issue.
First, it would seem rather odd (and detached from scientific practice) if,
in order to account for the second law of thermodynamics, we would have to
add to the mechanical laws a quantitative assumption about the distribution
of initial conditions of boxes of gas, or the like, that we find in our universe.
Second, the fact that we are generally ignorant about the exact microstate
of a system is true, but largely irrelevant. It is absurd to think that the
validity of the second law of thermodynamics could in any way depend on
what we know or believe or are able to observe.
Finally, if we are serious about our commitment to argue within the
paradigm of a particular deterministic theory, we have to take it to the con-
clusion that there is nothing more random about the physical processes that
give rise to subsystems in non-equilibrium states than about the entropy-
increasing processes going on within these subsystems, once they are suit-
ably isolated from their environment. Eventually one has to wonder why it
is true as a matter of fact that whenever someone prepares a gas in a low-
entropy state, it never ends up in one of the “bad” microscopic configurations
for which the gas would contract rather than expand. And then one has to
take seriously the fact that an act of “preparation” is itself a physical pro-
cess, following the same set of physical laws, with its outcome determined by
suitably specified initial conditions. Why are these initial conditions always
good ones, then? To defer the source of randomness to the outside, from the
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box of gas to the shaky hands of the experimentalist or to exterior perturba-
tions preventing the subsystem from being perfectly isolated, is just to pass
the buck. But the buck must stop, eventually, with the universe itself. For
the universe is what it is, it exists once and only once, there is nothing before
and nothing outside. And we either live in a universe that obeys the second
law of thermodynamics (on cosmological scales and, with the possibility of
very rare exceptions, in its branching sub-systems) or we don’t.
All that said, what is the difference between a statement of probabil-
ity and a typicality statement, and why is typicality the more appropriate
concept in this context?
For one thing, contrary to the conventional use of probabilities, typicality
is not a quantitative concept. The role of the typicality measure is only
to realize and give precise meaning to the notion of “almost all” or “the
overwhelming majority of” initial conditions and although it is common and
convenient and natural to use the Liouville measure, at least in the context
of classical mechanics, many different measures would yield the same notion
of typicality.10 In particular, we are not committed to giving meaning to
the exact number that the typicality measure assigns to every (measurable)
subset of phase-space. The only “probabilities” that are meaningful in this
context are 1 (or those close to 1) and 0 (or those close to 0) indicating what
Bernoulli called moral certainty and moral impossibility.11
Furthermore, in making a typicality statement, we do not commit our-
selves to talking about actual or hypothetical ensembles of systems, nor do
we use probabilistic concepts to express our “guess” – in terms of information
or knowledge or believe – about a system’s actual microstate. A typicality
statement refers to nothing more and nothing less than the fact that a cer-
tain (coarse-grained/macroscopic) property or behavior of a physical system
is typical according to the microscopic laws, i.e. that it’s the kind of prop-
erty or behavior that our fundamental theory predicts for an overwhelming
10On the other hand, many measures would yield a different notion of typicality. One
can think, for instance, of singular measures, concentrated on a single point in phase-space.
Such a measure may even turn out to be stationary, in case that this particular microstate
happens to be a stationary point of the dynamics. So why not take such a measure to
define “typicality”, meaning that a property is typical if and only if it is instantiated by
this one particular configuration? We trust the reader to answer this question for himself.
11See (Bernoulli, 1713). Such typicality statements can be understood in the sense
of Cournot’s principle, which is one of the basic principles underlying the philosophy
of Kolmogorov’s Grundbegriffe, but also stands in the philosophical tradition of great
mathematicians such as Emile Borel, Maurice Fréchet or Paul Lévy. See (Shafer and
Volk, 2006) for a beautiful essay on this topic.
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majority of microscopic configurations compatible with appropriately speci-
fied (macroscopic) boundary conditions: Typically, a coin tossed repeatedly
for a large number of times will land about as often on heads as on tails.
Typically, an ice cube at room temperate will melt. According to the laws of
quantum mechanics, a collection of point-particles shot successively through
a double-slit will typically (though not necessarily) display an interference
pattern when registered on a screen behind the slits. According to classical
mechanics, it typically won’t (although it possibly might).
A typicality statement is thus an objective physical fact, in principle
derivable from the fundamental (microscopic) laws that we take as the basis
of our considerations. (It is a fact that, by the way, even Laplace’s demon
should care about, to the degree that he cares about physics.) But what
exactly is it a fact about? Well, typicality is, first and foremost, the answer
to the question that stood at the very beginning of our discussion, namely:
what is the connection between the macroscopic regularities that physics is
supposed to account for and the underlying microscopic laws. Another way
to put it is to ask: What is the nomological status of the “macroscopic laws”?
4.3 Typicality and the status of macroscopic laws
Philosophically, the truly remarkable yet often unacknowledged aspect about
the probabilistic character of thermodynamic laws is not the way in which
laws that once have been thought to be exact turn out to be merely “approx-
imately true”, but the way in which the regularities expressed by these laws
turn out to be contingent rather than necessary truths. In other words, if
we accept the microscopic laws as fundamental, we have to accept that the
so-called “macroscopic laws”, even in an approximate or statistical sense, are
in fact no laws at all in that they lack the status of nomological necessity.
For all we know, the initial conditions of our universe (conceived as a New-
tonian universe) could have been such that systems, prepared or created in
a low-entropy state, would regularly end up on one of the “bad” trajectories
that undergo an anti-thermodynamic evolution of decreasing entropy. That
is to say that there are possible Newtonian universes in which gases are reg-
ularly found to contract rather than expand, in which heat does sometimes
flow from a colder to a hotter body and in which macroscopic objects such as
balls and chairs and tables occasionally jump up in the air (while cooling off
accordingly to account for the conservation of energy) simply because a large
number of particles happen to move in the same direction at the same time.
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In these counterfactual but nomologically possible universes, it is simply not
true that such events are very unlikely, because they happen “all the time”.12
And yet, we would insist, it’s more than a mere contingency, more than
a factum brutum that our universe is not like that. And indeed, our physical
theory has more to say here – fortunately without assigning us the impossible
task of determining the actual boundary conditions of our universe – for it
tells us that the initial conditions of a Newtonian universe would have to
be exceedingly special to give rise to subsystems violating thermodynamic
laws as more than astronomically rare exceptions. Thermodynamic laws,
in other words, are statistical regularities of typical universes. And it is this
characterization, we suggest, that specifies their connection to the underlying
microscopic laws and grounds their own law-like status.
Kripke (1980) famously explained the difference between logical and
nomological supervenience by the following metaphor: B-properties super-
vene logically on A-properties if, after fixing the A-properties of the world,
there was nothing else God could (or needed to) do for fixing the B-properties.
The A-properties, we say, logically entail the B-properties. In case of a nomo-
logical supervenience, however, God, after making sure of the A-facts, still
had some work to do for making sure of the B-facts by determining laws
of nature relating B-properties to A-properties. Going one step further, we
can say: a property of our world that is typical for these laws, is a fact or
regularity for which God, after fixing the laws of nature and the fundamental
ontology of the world, still had a little bit of work to do in choosing appro-
priate initial conditions for the universe. However, while almost any possible
choice (compatible with the relevant macroscopic constraints) would have
been fine to make sure that this property is instantiated, God would have
had to be utterly meticulous – and maybe somewhat malicious - to arrange
the initial configuration of the universe in such that it isn’t.
Turning back to the ‘second law’, we have to note one subtlety in con-
nection with the Past Hypothesis (see Section 2). According to the Past
Hypothesis, the initial macrostate of our universe was a very special one,
marking the low-entropy end of the thermodynamic arrow of time. How-
ever, with respect to this macrostate, the initial microstate of the universe
was typical (in regard to its future evolution), thus explaining the increase
12Of course, among all possible Newtonian universes there will be many with no thermo-
dynamic arrow and no interesting structures at all, but here, to make a point, we consider
universes that are hospitable to intelligent life, while the second law of thermodynamics
fails to hold in branching systems just as often as to make a fool out of physicists.
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of entropy in the universe as a whole and in any of its branching subsystems.
All in all, there is no contradiction, but a clear tension between the typicality
account and the Past Hypothesis. The resolution of this tension is considered
by many as one of the most profound problems of modern physics.13
What else is left to say? Not much, we believe. To understand that
a certain regularity is typical and yet to wonder why it is that we observe
this regularity in nature (and why we should expect this regularity to persist
in the future), is to ask why our universe is typical, i.e. why it is, in this
particular respect, like the overwhelming majority of all possible universes
instantiating the same set of fundamental physical laws. And while we don’t
know how to answer, except maybe with Einstein’s bon mot that “God is
subtle, but he is not malicious”, the very question seems to us utterly un-
compelling. Explanations have to end somewhere. If we can establish that a
certain property is typical for a particular kind of system, this should elevate
any sense of mystery or puzzlement as to why we find such systems instan-
tiating the respective property. Hence, we should consider the phenomenon
to be reasonably and conclusively explained on the basis of the microscopic
theory. Similarly, if we can establish that a macroscopic feature or regularity
is typical for a certain kind of system, we should by all reasonable means
expect to find this feature realized in a given system of the said kind. Hence,
it constitutes a prediction of the microscopic theory.
In this fashion, typicality statements figure in a way of reasoning about
nature. In fact, since the situation in which we find ourselves towards the
world is necessarily one in which all we can ever hope to know about the
world’s state is compatible with a plurality of fundamental (microscopic)
matters of fact, the relevant explanatory and behavior guiding statements
that we can extract from the fundamental laws of physics are virtually always
results about typical solutions of their equations of motion.
Finally, we shall emphasize again that a typicality reasoning is a non-
deductive reasoning. Logically, the fact that something has been shown to be
typical doesn’t imply anything about any particular instance. In other words,
it is always possible for a particular system – and ultimately our universe –
to be atypical in the relevant respect. But facts that strike us as atypical are
13See, for instance, (Penrose, 1999) and his “Weyl curvature hypothesis” as a proposal
for an additional law restricting the initial state of the universe, but also (Callender, 2004)
arguing from a Humean perspective against the need for further explanation of the Past
Hypothesis. See (Carroll, 2010) for a very nice discussion of the problem as well as (Carroll
and Chen, 2004) for an attempt to dispose of the Past Hypothesis altogether.
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usually the kind of facts that cry out for further explanation. This is why
a Casino manager has not just economic interest but reasonable grounds to
suspect cheating if a player hits three jackpots in a single night. And this is
why scientific practice would eventually require us to revise our theory and
look for different laws, rather than endorsing an explanation of empirical
data based on special initial conditions or, if you will, a streak of bad luck.
In the end, it is not logically but epistemically inconsistent to accept a certain
physical theory and accept at the same time that our universe is somehow
an atypical model of that theory, for this would undermine any reasons to
endorse the theory in the first place.14
5 Reply to critics
5.1 Missing the point of typicality
Despite the many subtleties involved in the concept of typically, we believe
this way of reasoning to be very natural and intuitive and very much in line
with common scientific practice. Nevertheless, it seems to us that quite a
lot of misunderstandings concerning Boltzmann’s statistical mechanics are
actually failures to appreciate the “logic” of typicality statements. One of the
most common mistakes, in fact, is simply to miss the difference between a
typicality statement and a statement about particular instances. Consider,
for instance, the objection of Roman Frigg in reply to Goldstein (2001):
Goldstein suggests that a system approaches equilibrium simply
because the overwhelming majority of states in ΓE are equilib-
rium microstates [...]. This is wrong. If a system is in an atypical
microstate [...], it does not evolve into a equilibrium microstate
just because the latter are typical; typical states do not automat-
ically function as attractors. (Uffink, 2007, 979–980) provides
the following example. Consider a trajectory x(t), i.e. the set
{x(t) = φt(x(t0)) | t ∈ [t0,∞)}, a set of measure zero in ΓE.
Its complement, the set ΓE \ x(t) of points not laying on x(t),
has measure one. Hence the points on x(t) are atypical while
the ones not on x(t) are typical (with respect to ΓE, µ, and the
property ‘being on x(t)’). But from this we cannot conclude that
a point on x(t) eventually has to move away from x(t) and end
up in Γ \ x(t); in fact the uniqueness theorem for solutions tells
14As was put so nicely by Mathias Frisch (private communication).
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us that it does not. The moral is that non-equilibrium states do
not evolve into equilibrium states simply because there are over-
whelmingly more of the latter than of the former, i.e. because the
former are atypical and the latter are typical. (Frigg, 2009, pp.
8–9).
Of course, no one is claiming, in the naive sense implied by Frigg, that
any specific trajectory will move to equilibrium “simply because” equilibrium
states are typical – just as no one claims that any specific lottery ticket must
lose “simply because” losing lottery tickets are typical. In the alluded sense,
a lottery ticket loses simply because someone picked the wrong numbers
and a system converges to equilibrium simply because its micro-evolution
carries the microscopic configuration into an equilibrium state. The relevant
assertion here is that the regions of phase-space that do not correspond to
the thermodynamic equilibrium are extremely special. And the claim is then
that solution-trajectories that wander around in phase-space, yet remain
confined, for an extensive amount of time, to those extremely special regions
of phase-space, will turn out to be themselves extremely special. And this is
to say, in other words, that typical initial conditions in non-equilibrium will
evolve into equilibrium and that typical equilibrium states will remain in (or
close to) equilibrium over very long periods of time.
So what is the point of the “counterexample” formulated by Jos Uffink
that made such an impression on Frigg? It’s obviously correct that a solution
x(t) of the equations of motion will never enter the phase-space region ΓE \
x(t) despite the fact that it has measure 1. Typical solutions, however, will.
In fact, it follows from the “uniqueness theorem” that every other solution
(with the same total energy) lies entirely in the set ΓE\x(t). So, leaving aside
the fact that this artificially crafted region of phase-space is of no physical
interest whatsoever, it is not clear what this example is actually supposed to
demonstrate. With all due respect, the debate seems a bit like people trying
to explain that a typical lottery ticket will fail to win the jackpot because of
the huge number of combinations that could be drawn, and Frigg and Uffink
running around with a winning lottery ticket in order to disprove them.
5.2 A comment on the ‘measure zero problem’
If Uffink’s example works at all, then as another instance of the so-called
“measure zero problem”, which is basically the observation that, as soon
as one goes to a more fine-grade description, any physical system is found
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to be atypical with respect to some (more or less natural) properties. In
particular, for a continuous state-space and a nonsingular measure, the actual
microscopic configuration and, as we just noted, even the entire trajectory
of a system will constitute a set of measure 0. Although this observation
receives ongoing interest and is often presented as a serious challenge to
typicality arguments (cf. Frigg, 2009, p. 23; Sklar, 1993), we don’t think
that it causes much of an embarrassment for the reasoning we presented.15
There are facts and regularities that can be explained on the basis of
the microscopic laws by virtue of being typical (like the frequency of ‘head’
and ‘tail’ in long series of coin-tosses being approximately 50 : 50). There
are contingent facts about physical systems that are not typical, but can be
explained in a different sense – usually by tracing them back to other (even
more) special states of affair. For instance, the state of our office is certainly
atypical with respect to the exact distribution of objects on the desk, but
we can tell some sort of causal story about how a used coffee mug ended up
near the keyboard and how the battered blue book came to lie on top of the
heavier red one. And finally there are facts like the one that a trajectory
through some physical state-space will never cross its complement – which
do not require further explanation, but are well-suited for creating confusion
where none is due.
5.3 The role of the dynamics
A different objection to the typicality account that can be found in the philo-
sophical literature is that it fails to make precise the dynamical assumptions
on which the argument rests (Uffink, 2008; Frigg, 2009, 2011; Frigg and
Werndl, 2012). Frigg and Werndl (2012) even go as far as declaring that
the typicality account is “mysterious” because the “connection with the dy-
namics” is unclear (p. 918). Jos Uffink (2008) writes on a similar note (as a
conclusion to his “counterexample” recited by Frigg and discussed above):
[I]n order to obtain any satisfactory argument why the system
should tend to evolve from non-equilibrium states to the equilib-
rium state, we should make some assumptions about its dynamics.
In any case, judgments like ‘reasonable’ or ‘ridiculous’ remain
partly a matter of taste. The reversibility objection is a request
for mathematical proof (which, as the saying goes, is something
15Thanks to Tim Maudlin for very helpful discussions on this issue.
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that even convinces an unreasonable person). (Uffink, 2007, p.
61)
We have both very much and very little to say to this objection. First and
foremost, we can emphasize that the typicality account is an explanation or
explanatory scheme – not a proof. To reject it for a lack of mathematical
rigor is thus to miss the point entirely. It lies in the nature of the problem
that rigorous mathematical results about systems with roughly 1023 degrees
of freedom are very hard to come by. And even in suitable thermodynamic
limits (where the number N of particles goes to infinity and other quantitates
in the microscopic model scale accordingly), proving convergence to equilib-
rium for a more or less realistic model remains an extremely difficult and
largely unresolved problem of mathematical physics. That said, while every-
body is entitled to his epistemic standards, there are usually good reasons
to settle for physical explanations that are conclusive enough to convince a
reasonable person. If, as an explanation of a macroscopic phenomenon, we
accepted nothing short of rigorous mathematical proof, the atomic hypoth-
esis would yet have to earn its merits. What is less a matter of personal
standards, however, is the reference to the reversibility objection. For the
reversibility objection, we must insist, is not so much a “request for math-
ematical proof” as a request for a conclusive explanation of macroscopic
irreversibility – or so it was in 1876. Boltzmann provided a conclusive ex-
planation soon after and we now have a very good understanding of how
irreversible macroscopic behavior can arise from reversible microscopic dy-
namics. Moreover, even if Uffink is not satisfied with Boltzmann’s answer,
it’s unclear what kind of dynamical assumption could help him, since one
thing the dynamics certainly are, by assumption, is reversible.
All in all, it’s hard to discern what exactly Uffink is confused about and
what precisely he’s objecting to. Frigg and Werndl, very much to their credit,
state more clearly what they have in mind:
In recent years several proposals have been put forward, which
aim to justify (something akin to) TD-like [thermodynamic-like]
behaviour in terms of typicality [...]. This programme is on the
wrong track. [...] Not all phase flows lead to TD-like behaviour
(for instance, a system of harmonic oscillators does not). So
the phase flows that lead to TD-like behaviour are a non-trivial
subclass of all phase flows on a given phase space, and the ques-
tion is how this class can be characterised. [...] What we need
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is a non-trivial specification of a property that only those flows
that give raise to TD-like behaviour possess. (Frigg and Werndl,
2011, pp. 4–5)
These demands, however, are much less reasonable than it might first seem.
To start with, it is important to keep in mind that while in statistical mechan-
ics we will sometimes discuss many-particle systems on the level of dynamical
systems, what we care about, in the end, is not dynamical system theory.
In particular, we do not care about measure-preserving flows in general, but
always have in mind a phase-flow generated by a huge number of interacting
particles constituting a particular physical system of interest.
Obviously, whenever we study a specific model, whether it possesses the
appropriate characteristics, i.e., whether it describes a gas rather than a fluid
(or nothing interesting at all) and whether it exhibits the right thermody-
namic behavior, will in the end depend on the Hamiltonian, comprising the
particle interactions and determining the system’s time-evolution. Also, one
should keep in mind that dynamical considerations, to a certain degree, are
already reflected in the partitioning of a system’s phase-space and the deter-
mination of the volume (respectively entropy) corresponding to the various
macro-regions. In particular, the equilibrium state can look very differently
depending on the broad characteristics of the microscopic interactions (e.g.,
for a drop of ink compared to a drop of oil in water).
On the other hand, we understand from Boltzmann’s analysis that, once
this stage is set, the explanation of thermodynamic behavior is extremely ro-
bust against the details of the microscopic model, precisely because it doesn’t
hinge on any narrowly-conceived properties of the dynamical system or the
interaction potentials. In particular, the explanatory work is almost entirely
done by the dominance of the equilibrium state and the notion of typical-
ity, without the need to emphasize special features of the dynamics. The
reason is simply that once we understand that the non-equilibrium region of
phase-space is vanishingly small compared to the equilibrium region, we see
that there is nothing special or remarkable about the dynamics for which
a typical set of solutions, starting in a non-equilibrium region, will quickly
spread over the equilibrium region and for which equilibrium configurations
will stay in equilibrium for most of the time. If you throw a rubber duck
into the Atlantic Ocean, what do you need to know about oceanic currents
in order to explain and predict and understand that it will almost certainly
spend most (if not all) of the time outside the region where the Titanic sank?
It is precisely the generality of Boltzmann’s argument that makes it so pow-
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erful, giving us an understanding of thermodynamic behavior as a virtually
universal feature of macroscopic systems.
All that said, we share neither Frigg’s and Werndl’s interest in charac-
terizing general phase-flows with respect to their thermodynamic behavior,
nor their expectation that it should be possible to state necessary and suffi-
cient criteria for convergence to equilibrium in terms of precise mathematical
properties characterizing the dynamics of roughly 1023 interacting particles.
In particular, we fail to see anything of physical or philosophical interest in
examples such as that of a system of uncoupled harmonic oscillators not ex-
hibiting thermodynamic behavior.16 In fact, the latter claim is not entirely
accurate. If one considers a system of oscillators with various but similar
frequencies, there is an interesting sense in which it can converge to equilib-
rium, namely from a state in which the oscillators are more or less in phase
into a state in which they aren’t.17 Presumably, what the authors mean to
say is that if we consider uncoupled harmonic oscillators as a model for the
gas, the argument for its convergence to equilibrium won’t go through. And
presumably, the authors are not actually preoccupied with the question why
it is that a collection of wiggling particles will not spread over a given volume,
but mean to demonstrate that the typicality account must be incomplete or
inconclusive because its conclusion does not follow from its premises. But to
argue like this is to misunderstand the nature of the explanation in the first
place, which has never been about stating a set of mathematical assumptions
from which to prove thermodynamic behavior in the abstract.
Indisputably, concerning the microscopic derivation of the second law,
very little is on firm mathematical ground. This is just a fact about the
current status of science. It is a fact that one might be unhappy about
and it is certainly a fact that will continue to motivate further research.
However, it is of utmost importance to understand that, contrary to what
some commentators have suggested, the difference between the explanatory
scheme that we have presented and a more rigorous proof of the second law
is not some secret ingredient like a dynamical assumption that proponents of
the typicality account have missed to specify, but a heap of very hard, very
technical work in mathematical physics. Good physics and good philosophy
of physics, on the other hand, is also about appreciating where our under-
standing of an issue depends on rigorous formalization and technical proof
and where it doesn’t.
16Which, by the way, is a common line of argument.
17See also the analysis of a system of anharmonic oscillators in (Bricmont, 2001).
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